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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§7K \-<l 10 '>( '" ll'llil liliir* iiiPl'H all \\i\; li.msk'ired In Hi i. < mil limn lln I H.ili SupriMiie 
Court.pursuant to Utah Code Aim. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff-Appellee" I eresa.Gu.ss ("R Is. Guss' " ) filed a Complaint against •.. 
Defendant/ Appellant Cher ) 1. In : ("Chei ] 1") onMarcl ' J K 
Guss alleged: 
6. At all times mentioned herein. * . *. ul was an invitee on 
Defendant's property, having gone !1ICK !*• (be purpose of receh-ing; 
COSmetiC ^ ' rv i i \»s 
7. • The Plaintiff, confined a» a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition, 
was leaving the premises ofilie Defendant when the Defendant's son 
attempted to pick up the. wheelchair in orri - 4--: ~ut the Plaintiff in he* 
vehicle. After raising the back wheels ol the wheelchair off the groum.. me 
Plaintiff was dropped onto t ir —--*- H - - ^ V -»' K-I-M , -USI.-M^MW. t k 
injuries alleged herein. 
8. A i m time prior to being raised in the wheelchair did the Plaintiff 
request to be lifted - m her wheelchair and placed *n her vehicle. As a 
result of the actions of the Defendants, and each of them, the negligence of 
the Defendants was the proximate cause of the *\:urrence in question -\vd 
the Plaintiffs, resulting injuries 
On January 16, 2007, Ms. Guss filed a First Amended Complaint against 
Cheryl and IX Pendant Derek Edvalson ("Derek") for negligence. (R. 36-42), 
Plaintiff alleged: 
9. ' . As a result of the actions of the Defendants, and each of them, the 
negligence of the Defendants was the proximate cause of the occurrence in 
question and the Plaintiffs resulting injuries. 
On March 9,2007, Cheryl filed a motion for summary judgment 
("Summary Judgment Motion"), requesting dismissal of Ms. Guss' Complaint 
on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact that would subject 
Cheryl to liability, since [1] Cheryl did not cause plaintiffs injuries and [2] Cheryl 
is not subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of the defendant, Derek 
Edvalson. (R. 52-53). 
On March 22, 2007, Ms. Guss served an opposition to Cheryl's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with a memorandum in support. ("Opposition to Summary 
Judgment") (A copy of Plaintiff s Opposition to Defendant's Cheryl, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
attached hereto as Exhibit A). In opposing summary judgment, Ms. Guss argued: 
"There is also a material question of fact as to whether or not Defendant 
Cheryl, Inc. could have been deemed to have been independently negligent 
simply by requesting her son to assist her client that had special needs since 
there is no indication he had previously been properly trained to help 
transfer individuals such as the Plaintiff on any previous occasion." 
(emphasis added) (Opposition to Summary Judgment, p.5). 
Ms. Guss further argued that the fact that Cheryl did not "lift" the Plaintiffs 
wheelchair personally does not release her from liability. Specifically, Ms. Guss 
stated: 
"One of the biggest issues of this case which the jury must be allowed to 
resolve are those actions of Cheryl, Inc. Simply put, a business owner 
cannot accept or assume the responsibility of transferring a client to or from 
her business and then request another employee, family member or 
bystander to assist in the transfer and then deny any responsibility for a 
negative outcome. This is irrespective of the employment relationship, if 
any... A jury could very well conclude that Cheryl, Inc. had a duty to 
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provide special instruction, direction, * . :• lervisionto Derek since she had 
previously assumed the responsibility u- :J- 1st Plaintiff" (emphasis added) . 
(Opposition to Summary Judgment, pp. 6 & 7).. •' = 
ield a hearing on Chery l's Si immary 
Judgment M<. . , R. 92 *S i At the h* »the Court raised the issue of why the 
corporation [Cheryl] couldn't be liable, even il lie {Duck] was not an employee 
between Cheryl and Derek, Ms. Guss renewed the arguments made in her written 
oppositiort, noting that if a business owner asks someone to do something for the • 
not the business owner should be held accountable (1 iearina Transcript 8:22 
9:3) At the conclusion of the hearing. ;1K Court denied Cheryl's Motion for 
Sumin.: i v . * : . , . ' . ' . ^ 
Qn April 1, 2008, Ms. Guss filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding a 
new cause of action against Derek. (R. "501-07). 
Shorth ,;; ior;. • IU ^.... * < .uss settled iier case against Derek. (See R . 
"I < * " ( ; • - \i; irefc ,2 2009 
(See R S i ^ • <: ^ 81 5; 8> % J • *; • wing the presentation of evidence by both 
parties, the Court discussed the jury instructions and specie * . . . JM ;orm eau. 
parh Iiad |H(ivinln| 'iml umipilnhi liml * M (oi Ihr (iiiir, (Sir lini! Imnsiripl 
"T I '" 465-477). Neither party objected to the jury instructions or special vei diet 
. 3 . 
form; neither party expressed concern that any necessary instruction(s) had been 
erroneously omitted. (TT 477:20-25). 
The jury instructions then framed the issues which the jury was to decide; 
the jury was informed that they "must decide whether Defendant Cheryl, Inc., and 
non-party Derek Edvalson were negligent." (Jury Instruction "JI" 15; TT 487:8-
15). Further, the jurors were instructed that, "If you decide that Cheryl, Inc. and 
Derek Edvalson's fault caused Teresa Guss harm, you must decide how much 
money will fairly and adequately compensate Teresa Guss for that harm. (JI 22; TT 
491:14-16). No instruction describing or defining 'Vicarious liability" was given 
to the jury, and no instruction discussed any consequence of finding Derek to be a 
volunteer. (TT 481-498). 
Following the instructions to the jury, counsel made their closing arguments. 
(TT 499-534). Cheryl's counsel made no reference to Derek's status as a volunteer 
barring recovery against Cheryl.1 (TT 516-527). In discussing the Special Verdict 
form, counsel for Cheryl advised the jury, "If you believe they [Cheryl and Derek] 
were negligent, Fm not going to tell you what to do, but if you do believe that, then 
1
 Appellant's brief alleges that counsel for Cheryl advised the jury "that if the jury 
found that Derek was a volunteer, then Cheryl could not be held liable." (Brief of 
Appellant, p.6). This assertion was not supported by the jury instructions or special 
verdict form; Appellee has found no such statement anywhere in the record. In fact, 
Appellant's reference to the record (TT 529:4-13) references the closing arguments 
of Ms. Guss' counsel, not Cheryl's counsel. The argument made in the referenced 
portion states the opposite, as follows: "he [Derek] was asked by his mother to 
come help, that's where the negligence comes in. He didn't know what he was 
doing, he wasn't trained properly. She [Cheryl] didn't know what he was doing 
and they made a mistake, that's called negligence." (TT 529:9-13). 
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I go to what I said in my opening, are you going to blame both of them? Yeah, 
unfortunately, I think you have to." (TT 519:2-5). Later, counsel for Cheryl 
specifically instructed the jury to return the verdict which he now challenges; he 
stated, "if you think this case is about damages, this number needs to be divided 
three ways, among all the parties, if that's what you decide." (emphasis added) (TT 
526:11-13). 
On March 12, 2009, the jury rendered its Special Verdict and answered the 
seven Interrogatories provided in the Special Verdict. (R. 865-67). The jury, in 
response to the first two Interrogatories, found that Cheryl, Inc. was negligent and 
her negligence was a cause of Ms. Guss' injuries; specifically these questions 
stated: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was 
negligent in performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence 
alleged by the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that negligence of the defendant, Cheryl, 
Inc., was either the sole proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause 
of the plaintiffs injuries. 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
(R. 865-67 \ 1-2). The jury also answered the same two questions affirmatively 
with respect to Derek Edvalson. (R. 865-67 j^ 3-4). The jury then apportioned 
negligence to each of the parties as follows: 
A. Defendant, Cheryl, Inc. 42 % 
- 5 -
B. Defendant, Derek Edvalson 20 % 
C. Plaintiff, Teresa Guss 38 % 
(R. 865-67 U 5). In response to Interrogatory 6, the jury determined that Derek 
Edvalson was a volunteer, and not an employee of Cheryl, Inc. (R. 865-67 f^ 6). 
The special verdict form gave no instruction or consequence to the effect of finding 
Derek Edvalson to be an employee or volunteer, but rather indicated that damages 
were to be calculated "if you answered either or both of questions 2 and 4 "Yes. . ." 
(R. 865-67 f7).2 
On March 16, 2009, Cheryl filed a motion for the revision of the decision 
denying summary judgment ("Rule 54(b) Motion"), seeking summary judgment 
based upon the jury's finding that Derek Edvalson was a volunteer. (R. 856-58). 
Ms. Guss responded to the Rule 54(b) motion, renewing the argument raised in 
opposition to summary judgment, that Cheryl could be negligent irrespective of the 
status of Derek and referencing the jury's finding of negligence and allocation of 
42% of fault to Cheryl (R. 881-90). The district court denied the Rule 54(b) 
motion, and in a minute entry held that: "The jury may have inferred from the 
evidence and a review of the Verdict Form that liability could be assessed against 
CHERYL, INC. independent of the status of Derek Edvalson." (R. 926). 
Importantly, the court also noted that the "Special Verdict Form, signed by the 
Interrogatories 2 and 4 addressed the issue of whether the respective negligence 
of each defendant was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries; pursuant to the 
special verdict form and the "either or both" language in Interrogatory 7, the jury 
was free to and could have apportioned all liability to Cheryl, Inc. regardless of the 
status of Derek Edvalson, further demonstrating that the verdict was appropriate. 
(R. 865-67). 
- 6 -
Jury, assessed liability to CHERYL, INC." (R. 926). Judgment was then entered 
against Cheryl on June 17, 2009. (R. 929-31). 
Cheryl's Notice of appeal was then filed (R. 940-41), followed by a Motion 
for summary disposition from Ms. Guss, which was denied on September 3,2009. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury's finding that Derek Edvalson was a volunteer does not preclude 
Ms. Guss from recovering from Cheryl, but merely serves to limit Ms. Guss' 
recovery to the percentage of negligence apportioned to Cheryl. The jury 
determined that each of the parties was negligent (including Cheryl) and this Court 
should uphold the verdict and affirm the district court's denial of Cheryl's 54(b) 
Motion. 
The negligence of each of the parties involved in this case has been at issue 
from the outset. The Plaintiff sued Derek and Cheryl for negligence. In 
opposition to Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Guss argued that there 
was a material question of fact as to whether or not Cheryl, Inc. could have been 
deemed to have been independently negligent simply by requesting her son to 
assist with her client that had special needs. Plaintiff argued there that Cheryl's 
liability or responsibility remained in effect, irrespective of any employment 
relationship with her son. The Court appropriately denied Cheryl's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, determining there were sufficient questions of fact left for a 
Cheryl's Brief affirmatively concedes this fact; the last sentence in the Nature of 
the Case section states, "Thereafter Ms. Guss sued Cheryl, Inc. and Derek for 
Negligence." (Brief of Appellant p. 2). 
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jury to decide. Cheryl's negligence was clearly an issue at the trial, without respect 
to the employee/volunteer status of Derek. 
Following the trial, the jury rendered its Special Verdict finding that Cheryl 
was negligent and that her negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs 
injuries. The jury also attributed negligence to Derek Edvalson and to the Plaintiff; 
while it was determined that Derek was a volunteer and not an employee of Cheryl, 
Inc.; finding Derek to be a volunteer does not create an inconsistent verdict or 
require revision of any prior ruling, but rather, it merely clarifies that Cheryl is not 
responsible (or vicariously liable) for the negligence apportioned to Derek, 
The juiy's verdict was in conformity with the evidence presented at trial and 
followed the law as given in the jury instructions. Notably, the jury followed the 
suggestion of Cheryl's counsel in reaching its verdict. Cheryl's counsel did not 
argue that finding Derek to be a volunteer would preclude recovery against Cheryl, 
but rather suggested that if the jury believed there was negligence, they should 
blame both Derek and Cheryl, and that any award of damages should be divided 
three ways. 
Cheryl's Rule 54(b) motion is a new approach, created in retrospect and is 
merely an attempt to escape responsibility by requesting reversal of the denial of 
the Summary Judgment Motion. The claim that Derek's volunteer status excused 
or eliminated Cheryl's negligence is incorrect and the motion was appropriately 
denied by the district court. Ms. Guss respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the trial court's denial of Cheryl's 54(b) Motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING CHERYL'S 54(b) MOTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to reconsider summary judgment is within the discretion of the trial court, 
and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Timm v. Dewsnup, 
921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). 
The jury's verdict in this case, found that each of the three parties involved 
was negligent in some way and thereby contributed to the injuries sustained by Ms. 
Guss. (R. 866-67). The Rule 54(b) Motion is an attempt to disrupt the verdict. 
Cheryl is attempting to escape the liability apportioned by the jury by claiming that 
Derek's volunteer status frees her from not only vicarious liability, but any 
liability. The jury affirmatively attributed negligence to Cheryl. Negligence was 
also attributed to Derek and Ms. Guss. This allocation of negligence to each of the 
respective parties demonstrates that the jury believed each party was at fault for 
their own behavior. The relief sought by Cheryl would only be appropriate were 
the facts such that Cheryl was somehow being held accountable for the negligence 
attributed to Derek; that is not the case, and thus the district court acted 
appropriately in denying Cheryl's 54(b) motion. 
The verdict rendered is exactly that suggested by Cheryl's counsel in 
closing arguments, when he advised, "if you think this case is about damages, this 
number needs to be divided three ways, among all the parties, if that's what you 
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decide." (emphasis added) (TT 526:11-13). Cheryl's argument on appeal, that the 
verdict should be disregarded is disingenuous, and the trial court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE JURY TRIAL WAS TO ADDRESS 
AND RESOLVE THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PARTIES 
INVOLVED. 
Ms. Guss' complaints against Cheryl and Derek sufficiently alleged 
negligence. Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment sought dismissal of the 
complaint on two distinct grounds, first, that Cheryl did not cause plaintiffs 
injuries, and second, that Cheryl was not subject to vicarious liability for the 
negligence of defendant Derek Edvalson. Thus, more than vicarious liability was 
at issue. Ms. Guss opposed that Motion on grounds that Cheryl could be held 
liable based upon Ms. Edvalson's actions, and without regard to the employment 
status of Derek. The negligence of all parties was at issue at trial, the special 
verdict is direct evidence of the issues tried, and should not be disturbed. 
A. Ms. Guss' Complaints Provided Sufficient Notice of the 
Negligence Claim Against Cheryl. 
Under Utah law, pleadings, such as a complaint, need not be specific. Rule 
8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires only that a complaint contain a "short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and 
explains that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); (f). Subdivision (a) [of Rule 8] is to be liberally construed 
-10-
when determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 
1352,1353 (Utah 1986). 
A pleading need only be sufficient to provide notice to the defendant of the 
nature of the claims presented against him. See, e. g., Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT 
App 518 H 36-37, 127 P.3d 1224, 1231. The fundamental purpose of the 
liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the 
requirement that their adversaries have fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). In addition, "When 
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). Failure to amend "does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues." Id. 
Plaintiffs complaint and amended complaints alleged that the defendants, 
and each of them, were negligent and caused the injuries she sustained. Ms. Guss' 
Complaint stated: 
7. The Plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition, 
was leaving the premises of the Defendant when the Defendant's son 
attempted to pick up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her 
vehicle. After raising the back wheels of the wheelchair off the ground, the 
Plaintiff was dropped onto the concrete driveway below, sustaining the 
injuries alleged herein. 
8. At no time prior to being raised in the wheelchair did the Plaintiff 
request to be lifted form her wheelchair and placed in her vehicle. As a 
- 1 1 -
result of the actions of the Defendants, and each of them, the negligence 
of the Defendants was the proximate cause of the occurrence in question 
and the Plaintiffs resulting injuries. 
(emphasis added) (R. 1-6 fflf 7-8). The allegations made in the Complaint provided 
Cheryl with sufficient notice that Ms. Guss was seeking a recovery based upon a 
theory of negligence.4 This theory was raised in the pleadings and was present 
throughout the litigation and at trial. 
B. Cheryl's Independent Negligence was Raised by Ms. Guss and 
the Court at Summary Judgment 
CheryPs Motion for Summary Judgment identified two distinct issues on its 
face, further evidencing that Cheryl was aware of the negligence claim and that the 
question of vicarious liability was not the only claim being litigated. Cheryl sought 
summary judgment on grounds that [1] Cheryl did not cause plaintiffs injuries and 
[2] Cheryl is not subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of defendant, 
Derek Edvalson. (R. 52-53). In opposition to summary judgment, Ms. Guss 
succinctly raised the issue of Cheryl's independent negligence, stating: 
"There is also a material question of fact as to whether or not Defendant 
Cheryl, Inc. could have been deemed to have been independently negligent 
simply by requesting her son to assist her client that had special needs since 
there is no indication he had previously been properly trained to help 
4
 Cheryl has argued that Ms. Guss did not raise Cheryl's "independent negligence" 
until opposing the 54(b) motion (See Brief of Appellant, p. 19). This argument 
implies that "independent negligence" is essentially a term of art, requiring specific 
averments. This terminology was actually raised by Ms. Guss initially in 
opposition to Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, not as a term of art, but to 
specify that Cheryl's actions or failure to act could subject Cheryl to liability, apart 
from any negligence apportioned to Derek. 
-12-
transfer individuals such as the Plaintiff on any previous occasion." 
(emphasis added) (Opposition to Summary Judgment, p.5). 
In further opposition to the summary judgment motion, Ms. Guss addressed 
independent negligence once again, and argued that the fact that Cheryl did not 
personally "lift" the wheelchair did not release her from liability, but that the 
actions of Cheryl was one of the biggest issues of the case and the jury could find 
Cheryl responsible, irrespective of the employment relationship. (Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, p.p. 6 & 7). These same points were addressed at oral 
argument, by counsel for Ms. Guss and the Court. (See HT 5:9-15; 8:22-9:3). 
C. Cheryl's Negligence was an Issue at Trial. 
The clearest indication that Cheryl had adequate notice of the negligence 
claim is to look at the questions presented to the jury, the jury instructions, and the 
arguments Cheryl's counsel offered with respect to these issues and instructions. 
First, not only did Cheryl fail to offer any objection to the jury instructions and 
special verdict form, but its counsel has indicated that Cheryl drafted these 
documents. (Brief of Appellant, p. 6; TT 470:20-21). Completely missing from 
the jury instructions is any definition or description of the term "vicarious liability" 
or the consequence of finding Derek to be a volunteer rather than an employee. 
The jury was specifically instructed that they "must decide whether 
Defendant, Cheryl, Inc., and non-party, Derek Edvalson, were negligent." (JI15; 
TT 487:8-15). The jury was also told, "If you decide that Cheryl, Inc. and Derek 
Edvalson's fault caused Teresa Guss harm, you must decide how much money will 
- 1 3 -
fairly and adequately compensate Teresa Guss for that harm." (Jl 22; TT 491:14-
16). The first Interrogatory on the special verdict form again illustrates that 
Cheryl's negligence was an issue at trial This question was presented to and 
answered by the jury as follows: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was 
negligent in performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence 
alleged by the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
(R. 866-67 f 1). The jury followed this response by finding that Cheryl's 
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Guss' injuries, that Derek was negligent, 
and his negligence was a cause of Ms. Guss' injuries. (R. 866-67 | f 2-4). 
Despite the lack of any jury instruction regarding "vicarious liability" 
Cheryl claimed to have advised the jury that finding Derek to be a volunteer would 
preclude Ms. Guss from recovering against her. (Brief of Appellant p. 17). A 
review of the closing arguments shows that Cheryl's counsel did not make this 
assertion. (TT 499-534). To the contrary, in closing Cheryl's counsel told the 
jury, "If you believe they [Cheryl and Derek] were negligent, I'm not going to tell 
you what to do, but if you do believe that, then I go to what I said in my opening, 
are you going to blame both of them? Yeah, unfortunately, I think you have to." 
(TT 519:2-5). Additionally, counsel for Cheryl specifically instructed the jury to 
return the verdict which is now being challenged; he stated, "if you think this case 
-14-
is about damages, this number needs to be divided three ways, among all the 
parties, if that's what you decide." (emphasis added) (TT 526:11-13). 
Thus, not only did was there sufficient notice that independent negligence 
was at issue, Cheryl's counsel suggested that both Cheryl and Derek should be held 
responsible, and that if damages were awarded, they should be divided among 
Derek, Cheryl and Ms. Guss. The jury's verdictand the arguments of Cheryl's 
counsel clearly show that Cheryl's negligence was an issue at trial, presented with 
the consent of the parties. When such issues "are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings" and any failure to amend "does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues." See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). As such, the jury's verdict was in 
conformity with the evidence and the district court was proper in denying Cheryl's 
54(b) Motion, and it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm that decision. 
IIL No New Trial is Warranted, as the Jury's Verdict Was Not 
Inconsistent 
As an alternative remedy, Cheryl requests a new trial claiming that the 
jury's verdict was inconsistent. This argument was not properly preserved and 
should not be considered; in addition, this contention also lacks merit and Cheryl's 
request for a new trial should be denied. 
A. Cheryl's Request for a New Trial Was Not Preserved 
"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue 
in the trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v. 
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Searle, 2001 UT App 367,1fl7, 38 P.3d 307, 313 (internal quotations omitted). In 
addition, "[f]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least 
be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." 
LeBaron & Assocs. V. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quoting James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
The request for a new trial based on an inconsistent verdict is a novel 
argument, raised by Cheryl for the first time on appeal. Cheryl's 54(b) Motion 
sought revision of the trial court's prior denial of a motion for summary judgment. 
Cheryl did not raise the issue of an inconsistent verdict to the trial court and as such 
the issue should not be considered by this Court. 
B. The Jury's Verdict Was Not Inconsistent 
"Where the possibility of inconsistency in . . . special verdicts exists, the 
courts will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the 
answers if possible." Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 
1083 (Utah 1985). It is well established that "jury verdicts must be interpreted so 
as to avoid inconsistency whenever possible: Where there is a view of the case that 
makes the jury's answers to the special interrogatories consistent, they must be 
resolved that way." Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963). 
Should this Court choose to consider the merits of Cheryl's claim of an 
inconsistent verdict, this contention lacks merit and the request should be denied. 
Prior to addressing the jury's answers, Ms. Guss reminds the Court that Cheryl's 
counsel suggested that the jury blame both Derek and Cheryl, specifically, Cheryl 
directed the jury that,, "if you think this case is about damages, this number needs 
to be divided three ways, among all the parties, if that's what you decide." 
(emphasis added) (TT 526:11-13). There was no limiting language, in formal 
instructions or in argument, which advised that finding Derek to be a volunteer 
would preclude Ms. Guss from recovering against Cheryl. 
The verdict form, prepared by Cheryl, and given to the jury without 
objection or exception, was clear and concise and resulted in a verdict which is 
consistent and is fully justified by the evidence. Cheryl makes little, if any, 
reference to the fact that the jury found Cheryl to be negligent, by their response to 
the first interrogatory. (R. 866-67 \ 1). The jury also found Derek to be negligent, 
by their response to the third interrogatory. (R. 866-67 \ 3). The responses to the 
questions posed determined that the respective negligence of Cheryl and Derek was 
found to be a proximate cause of Ms. Guss' injuries. (R. 866-67 ffif 2; 4). 
Following the suggestion of Cheryl's counsel, the negligence was split three ways, 
42% to Cheryl, 20% to Derek, and 38% to Ms. Guss. (R. 866-6715). 
Cheryl asserts that the jury's answer to interrogatory 6 creates an 
inconsistency (or in the alternative merits reversal of the denial of the summary 
judgment motion). Number 6 was presented and answered as follows: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a 
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that the defendant, Derek Edvalson, 
was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer. 
Employee 
Volunteer X 
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(R. 866-67 f^ 6). This finding does not create an inconsistent verdict, but is in 
harmony with the rest of the jury's responses. The only consequence of this 
response is that Cheryl is only responsible for the negligence attributed to her, and 
is not responsible for any negligence attributed to Derek. Ms. Guss didn't object to 
this question because it would not bar her recovery, but would clarify whether 
Cheryl was only responsible for her actions/negligence or whether she would be 
responsible for Derek as well. 
Cheryl's request for a new trial, on the basis of an inconsistent verdict 
should therefore be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
affirm the district court's denial of Cheryl, Inc.'s Motion for Revision of the 
Decision Denying Summary Judgment, and additionally, that Appellants request 
for a new trial also be denied. 
DATED this /V day of February, 2010. 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
William R. Rawlings 
Travis B. Alkire 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appelt 
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-19-
Tab A 
ADDENDUM 
-20-
WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS #6784 
TRAVIS B. ALKIRE #11024 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
11576 South State Street, Suite 401 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 553-0505 
JN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA H 
TERESA GUSS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHERYL, INC. and DOES 1 THROUGH 
10 INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
PLATNTDTF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT CHERYL, INC.'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060903837 
Honorable L. A. Dever 
Plaintiff Teresa Guss, by and through her attorney William R. Rawlings, hereby submits her 
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff's motion will be based upon the 
Points and Authorities attached hereto, Plaintiff and Defendant's depositions as well as argument of 
counsel Dated this day of March, 2007, for the law office of William R. Rawlings, by William R. 
Rawlings, attorney for Plaintiff Teresa Guss. 
1 
DATED this day of March, 2007. 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM^ RAWLINGS 
2 
WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS #6784 
TRAVIS B. ALKIRE #11024 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
11576 South State Street, Suite 401 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 553-0505 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERESA GUSS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHERYL, INC, DEREK EDVALSON and 
DOES 1 THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
CHERYL, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060903837 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
Plaintiff, Teresa Guss, by and through her counsel of record, William R. Rawlings, hereby 
submits her opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that genuine 
issues of material fact exist in regards to negligence as well as to issues regarding the status of the 
relationship between Defendant Cheryl, Inc. and Defendant Derek Edvalson. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff takes issue with regard to Nos. 6,7, 8,16,18 and 19 of Defendant's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in that although they are undisputed, they are incomplete as well These specific 
statements have been addressed below and create material issues of fact in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF CONTROVERTED FACTS 
6. Plaintiff called Defendant from her mobile phone while she was in Defendant's 
driveway. It had been the Defendant's course of conduct to provide assistance to Plaintiff to get her 
inside her business as well as outside her business and into her vehicle following facial services. 
(Defendant Dep. Pg. 20, lines 10-25; page Pg. 21 lines 1-25). It is also noted that Defendant Derek 
Edvalson was specifically requested by Defendant Cheryl Edvalson to help her into her business by 
providing assistance to Plaintiff because "we're girls and he's a man, it was easier for him to carry 
her". (Defendant Dep. Pg. 22, lines 11-25; page 23, lines 1-2). 
7. One or both of Cheryl, Inc.'s employees were present on the day of the accident as 
indicated. However, Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts fails to mention that her employees 
had previously been requested by Defendant Cheryl to assist Plaintiff. (Defendant Dep. Pg. 16, lines 
18-25; Pg. 17, lines 1-5). 
8. As stated, Cheryl, her employees, and Defendant Derek Edvalson all were assisting 
Plaintiff into her vehicle with Defendant Derek Edvalson lifting the wheelchair resulting in 
Defendant's fall. Mr. Edvalson would help Plaintiff out of her car as well as into her car and 
Defendant Cheryl was always present when Plaintiff was being assisted by Defendant Derek 
Edvalson "so I would make sure as a customer she was taken care of to leave". (Defendant Dep. Pg. 
23, lines 17-25; Pg. 24, lines 1-25; Pg. 25, lines 1-2). 
16. This statement demonstrates a course of conduct regarding the services which were 
provided to Plaintiff by employees of Defendant Cheryl, Inc. at Cheryl's request. As previously 
2 
stated, if Defendant Derek Edvalson were available, he would be requested by Defendant Cheryl to 
assist At no time did Defendant Cheryl ever tell Defendant Derek Edvalson not to assist. 
(Defendant Dep. Pg. 25, lines 19-24). 
18. This statement shows "supervisory control" by Defendant Cheryl over Defendant 
Derek Edvalson. Although Defendant Derek Edvalson was not a "paid employee", he was operating 
under the direction and supervision of Defendant Cheryl, Inc. and specifically for the benefit of 
Cheryl, Inc. (Edvalson Dep. at 22-23). 
19. This statement of undisputed facts shows "implied consent" on the part of Cheryl to 
take advantage of her son's efforts to assist her business while also personally being involved in 
assisting the Plaintiff to and from her vehicle. (Edvalson Dep. Pg. 24). 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that "summary judgment should be granted with 
great caution in negligence cases", Williams v. Melby 699 P. 2d 723 (Utah 1985), and while 
"summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the 
most clear-cut cases". Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P. 2d 126 (Utah 1987). 
I. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
EXISTS IS A QUESTION OF FACT 
Whether an employee-employer relationship exists may not be determined as a matter of law 
on summary judgment in either side's favor because reasonable minds may disagree on the nature of 
the relationship. State Compensation Fund v. Yellow Cab Company of Phoenix, 197 Ariz. 120,3 P. 
3d 1040 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1999, review denied) (May 23,2000). 
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In the current instance, issues of agency would apply. Although Defendant Derek Edvalson 
may not have received a salary for his services he provided on behalf of Cheryl Inc., he certainly 
provided a benefit to Defendant Cheryl, Inc. Further, it was at Cheryl, Inc.'s request that her son 
assist in transferring Plaintiff to her vehicle. 
It should also be noted, where work is done on the premises of the employer there is an 
inference of an employment relationship. Proving Existence of Employment Relationship, 22 
AmJur., Proof of Facts 3d 353. 
Another important factor in determining whether or not Cheryl, Inc. would be liable for the 
actions of Defendant would be the issue of control. 
The usual test in such circumstances, that is to say, the determination of liability for 
a negligent act on the part of a servant, is the right or the power on the part of the 
person in charge, to command and control the servant, in the performance of the 
causal act at the moment of performance. Under these conditions, the employer or 
master is the person who at the moment has the power or control. Bingham City 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 66 Utah 390,393; 243 P. 113,114. 
H. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS RARELY APPROPRIATE IN 
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS. 
It is well settled that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence action; even 
when the facts are undisputed, the issue still must be submitted to the jury if reasonable men could 
reach different conclusions or inferences from those facts, and the courts should be cautious in 
granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue requires the 
determination of state of mind. Crowley v. Madson Navigation Company, C. A. 5th, 1970,434 F. 
2d 73,75. 
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In addition, in the case cited by the Defendant, Kitchen v. Cal Gas Company, Inc., 821 P. 2d 
458, 461 (Utah Ct App. 1991), the court addresses the issue of negligence as being normally a 
question of fact. The issue of negligence, or breach of a legal duty, is normally a question of fact for 
the jury. Harris v. Utah Transit Auth, 671 P. 2d 217,220 (Utah 1983). 
In Defendant's argument I. page 6, the example is given of an owner and employees 
"observing" the actions of Defendant Derek Edvalson and suggesting that had they actually lifted the 
wheelchair, vicarious liability would attach. In this instance, the owner and employees were doing 
mote than simply observing Mr. Edvalson's actions. Not only did they count on him to help out 
when he was requested "because we're girls and he's a man . . . we would have him carry her 
because he was strong enough to do it". (Defendant Dep. Pg. 22, lines 18-25 and Pg. 23, lines 1-2). 
They were also assisting the Plaintiff from the business to her vehicle. (Defendant Dep. Pg. 24, lines 
13-25). 
Finally, the Defendant made a conscious effort to assist Plaintiff due to the Plaintiffs 
condition by allowing for more time. (Defendant Dep. Pg. 34, lines 18-24). 
There is also a material question of fact as to whether or not Defendant Cheryl, Inc. could 
have been deemed to have been independently negligent simply by requesting her son to assist with 
her client that had special needs since there is no indication he had previously been properly trained 
to help transfer individuals such as the Plaintiff on any previous occasion. (Defendant Dep. Pg. 36, 
lines 4-25). 
5 
There is no question that Defendant Cheryl, Inc. and her employees assisted in helping 
Plaintifftohercar. To what degree they assisted, however, is subject to interpretation. The fact that 
she did not "lift" the Plaintiff's wheelchair does not remove her obligation and duty to make sure 
everyone involved (employees or otherwise) properly transferred the Plaintiff to her vehicle. Once 
the Defendant undertook to provide this service to her special needs clients, she had a duty of due 
care to make sure that the transfer was properly performed. 
CONCLUSION 
There are numerous issues of fact regarding the events leading up to the injury sustained by 
the Plaintiff. One of the biggest issues of this case which the jury must be allowed to resolve are 
those actions of Defendant Cheryl, Inc. Simply put, a business owner cannot accept or assume the 
responsibility of transferring a client to or from her business and then request another employee, 
family member or bystander to assist in the transfer and then deny any responsibility or liability for a 
negative outcome. This is irrespective of the employment relationship, if any. 
Other material issues include whether Defendant Cheiyl Edvalson was negligent in requiring 
her son (who was untrained) to assist in helping the Plaintiff into her vehicle, whether she was 
negligent in the manner in which she andher employees assistedPlaintiff to her vehicle, and whether 
her son Defendant Derek Edvalson could be deemed an employee for vicarious liability purposes. 
Defendant was not simply an innocent bystander that came upon the scene to assist Plaintiff into her 
car. Mr. Edvalson was requested by Defendant Cheryl, Inc. to help assist the Plaintiff. He had 
previously assisted the Plaintiff on three to six prior occasions at the request of Cheryl before the 
6 
accident took place. There was a benefit to Defendant Cheryl, Inc. since she wanted to assist her 
clients in order to continue their professional relationship. There was no benefit bestowed upon 
Defendant Derek Edvalson. 
On page 8 of Defendant's Memorandum, they argue that Ms. Edvalson's request to Derek 
"was made as a parent and not as a manager". This in and of itself creates a question of fact. The 
argument goes on to state that Ms. Edvalson did not provide instructions, direction, or other 
supervision at the time of the accident". This is a material issue of fact A jury could very well 
conclude that Cheryl, Inc. had a duty to provide special instruction, direction, or supervision to Derek 
since she had previously assumed the responsibility to assist Plaintiff. 
This accident occurred on Defendant's business property and the Plaintiff would be 
considered a business invitee. Defendant Derek Edvalson was performing or engaging in an activity 
generally performed by Defendant Cheryl, Inc.'s employees. It was being done at the request and for 
the benefit of Cheryl, Inc. Defendant Cheryl, Inc. and/or her employees, along with Defendant Derek 
Edvalson, were all assisting Plaintiff at the time of the accident (See Undisputed Fact #8). 
Based upon the foregoing, is respectfully requested that the Court deny Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this £ £ ^ day of March, 2007. 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM^^ 
By (A/J/fj/ J 
William Ryfe^wlings / 
Attorney^/Plaintiff 
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